Category: EMR

EMR April 2026

Dear Reader

Our analysis of the long-term relationship between inflation and short- and long-term interest rates, as well as the DJIA stock index, has repeatedly piqued our curiosity. The reader might ask himself: why do we focus on the United States? Our answer is simple: long-term data availability. Ex-amining the following charts of short- and long-term U.S. interest rates, along with the corresponding inflation rates, we are faced with a specific puzzle that many analysts seem unwilling to acknowledge. The real ques-tion is: why are interest rates high both when inflation is strongly positive and when it is strongly negative? Most of the data and concept go back to the exchange I have had with an interesting colleague: S.C. Leuthold.

A surprising fact worth keeping in mind when evaluating the current public debate, on interest rate regulation is the historical observation that short-term interest rates have reached their lowest levels precisely during peri-ods when inflation fluctuated between +2% and (+/-5%).

Further, we ask ourselves: what do the charts implicate? Well, they show that the trend in long-term interest rates differs slightly from that of short-term rates, with one significant difference: interest rates are higher when inflation exceeds 5%. An additional specific aspect, we find difficult to assess, concerns the reason/s why interest rates are rising at both ends of the spectrum, as shown in the two charts of interest rates.

TREND – DETERMINISTIC ASPECTS

Of specific interest, at today’s crossing, are the effective repercussions of inflation, as well as of interest rates, on the equity market, here shown by the changes of the DJIA. The pertinent question we ask ourselves is, whether interest rate reworkings, as repeatedly demanded by prominent politicians, are the appropriate medicine to solve all current economic diffi-culties, concerning not only the DJIA performance.

Comparing the developments of the DJIA with those of interest rates and inflation, we are confronted with a rather intricate puzzle, that few ana-lysts seem to take into account or choose to ignore – namely, the weak correlation between these factors.

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CURRENT INVESTMENT STRATEGY

We believe that the current outlook is truly challenging. To feel appropri-ately comfortable, let us make the following specific assumptions or hy-pothesis:

• The first hypothesis that comes to our mind, is the risk of a large-scale war, as recent developments in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown and continue to do so. We hope that the situation does not es-calate further.
• The second hypothesis concerns the inflationary impacts of rising crude oil prices. In this context, we are placing much greater emphasis on “significant volatility” while hoping that policymakers will take steps to improve the availability of raw materials, particularly of crude oil. We believe this scenario represents a plausible outcome, pushing inflation higher, regardless of an appropriate adjustment in monetary policy.
• A third hypothesis concerns the impacts on currencies. In our specific case, we anticipate a further appreciation of the Swiss franc. However, we may be facing a rather erratic performance.

Consequently, our current assessment remains primarily focused on ex-pectations, with a greater emphasis than usual on the domestic economy, the currency, and the stock market. From a strategic perspective, we an-ticipate further appreciation of the Swiss franc, a relatively stable EUR against the CHF, and further depreciation of the USD against both the CHF and the EUR.

SHORT-TERM EXPECTATIONS

We consider that the tariffs imposed by President Trump are key factors shaping the short- and medium-term outlook, as they undoubtedly amount to a tax increase. It is worth recalling that consumer spending has recently been the engine of economic activity – that is, the main driver of GDP growth – and this not only in the United States!

As implicitly revealed in the above shown charts, we consider the historical comparison as truly astonishing. We conclude that Trump’s opaque tax policy could continue to be an extremely important factor for economic ac-tivity and, at the same time, have a strong deterministic influence on the developments of inflation, and this not only for the US. We expect signifi-cant effects on a global scale.

Consequently, we expect – or worse – we fear a fairly deterministic indica-tion of a decline in economic activity, particularly regarding consumer and investment spending on a global scale.

SUMMA SUMMARUM

Readers may ask themselves why we make use of the “extremely” long-term comparison? What we implicitly try to do is to look at statistical facts which played a crucial, forcing role in the past and use them to avoid pos-sible future mistakes. The above shown developments e.g. of short-term interest rates tells us that, on an average band of inflation basis, the DJIA follows a similar growth path (coherent with rising negative resp. positive) rates of inflation.

The coming quarters are likely to see a slowdown in economic activity, particularly in the United States and, in due course, also on global mar-kets. From an investment perspective, these trend forecasts will undoubt-edly be significant. If we assess the situation correctly, they point to a clear HOME BIAS for both equities and currencies.

The promising approach we intend to follow at this time is known as DI-VERSIFICATION, which currently appears to be the primary indication of a “free lunch” at both the local and international levels.

EMR March 2026

Dear Reader

INTEREST RATES & INFLATION?

Examining the following chart of long-term US real GDP both on a level basis and on a percent change basis we can infer that, over the longer term, volatili-ty, on average, dropped significantly. The average until 2000 amount to 3.6%, while the average since 2000 amounts to 2.17%. We tale note, that without the turbulences of 2001, the average would be significantly lower. Determining fac-tors that we can infer from the data refer primarily on economic changes as well as of recently on political interventionism.

A determinant for a promising investment policy tells us, that from now on, it will be essential to look beyond short-term political jargoning by the Trump ad-ministration, while focusing on the intrinsic forces of market participants.

From a strategic perspective, we anticipate a further appreciation of the Swiss franc, a relatively stable Euro against the CHF, and a further depreciation of the US dollar against the CHF.

TREND – DETERMINISTIC ASPECTS

Examining the recent performances of the main components of the Swiss and US GDP data, as shown in the following charts, it is clear that in the Swiss case, public spending and foreign trade played a decisive role, while in the United States the main drivers have been foreign trade (Trump’s measures) and gross private fixed investment. We note that the available data clearly indicate that the impacts in the two countries differ significantly, requiring a coherent fore-casting approach.

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CURRENT INVESTMENT STRATETY

The current outlook is truly challenging. To be sufficiently comfortable, we will make the following specific assumptions:

• The first hypothesis concerns the rather confused political agenda of the Trump administration. Therefore, for 2026, we will have to deal with a US administration that might follow a path similar to that of 2025. Assuming that it is not possible to predict changes with a sufficiently high degree of operational credibility, we assume that the US administration will continue to call for interest rate cuts in order to contain inflation fears. Secondly, we as-sume that the persistent weakness of political leadership in Western coun-tries will continue to require considerable attention to their respective do-mestic markets and currency allocation.
• A second deterministic assumption, in terms of asset allocation, concerns the whereabouts of the respective currencies. At present, from the Swiss in-vestor’s perspective, we anticipate a strengthening trend for the CHF. In other words, we anticipate a weakening trend for both the USD and the EUR.
• A third hypothesis concerns the future of technological innovation, which ought to continue to play a decisive role in the asset allocation process.
• A fourth hypothesis concerns the attention to the main components of GDP. At this point, we continue to believe that the engine of economic growth lies primarily in consumer spending and firm fixed investment.

Consequently, our current assessment remains primarily focused on ex-pectations, with greater attention than usual being paid to the domestic economy, currency, and stock market.

SHORT-TERM EXPECTATIONS

We consider the tariffs imposed by Mt. Trump to be the primary determinants of the short- to medium-term outlook, as they undoubtedly represent a tax increase, especially in relation to consumer spending. Let us remember that consumer spending has recently been the engine of economic activity, i.e., the main driver of GDP growth, andd this not only in the United States!

The tariff increases decided by Trump are considered to be as effective as a tax increase. In this context, we should bear in mind that President Trump’s trade policy represents a significant, i.e. deterministic, reduction in the supply of goods and services, with expected negative effects on inflation.

As implicitly shown in the charts above, we consider the historical comparison to be truly astonishing. We conclude that Trump’s opaque tax policy could contin-ue to be an extremely important factor for economic activity and, at the same time, have a strong deterministic influence on the development of inflation, and this not only for the US. We expect significant effects on a global scale.

Consequently, we expect – or worse, we fear – a fairly deterministic warning of a decline in economic activity, caused in particular by consumption and invest-ment spending on a global scale.

SUMMA SUMMARUM

The coming quarters are likely to see a slowdown in economic activity, particu-larly in the United States and, in due course, also on global markets. From an investment perspective, these trend forecasts will undoubtedly be significant. If we assess the situation correctly, they point to a clear HOME BIAS for both equi-ties and currencies. The most promising approach remains DIVERSIFICATION, which currently ap-pears to be the only “free lunch” that holds promise at both the local and inter-national levels

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since February 28, 2026, the escalation between the US, Israel, and Iran has significantly heightened geopolitical risks in the Middle East. At the heart of the economic consequences is the partial restriction of shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important bottlenecks in global oil trade. As approx-imately one-fifth of global crude oil exports pass through this route, energy markets are extremely sensitive to any form of blockage or uncertainty. A pro-longed bottleneck is likely to tighten global supply and noticeably increase risk premiums in oil prices. In the short term, a significant rise in prices is therefore expected, particularly for Brent (North Sea oil) and WTI (US crude oil).

Should the situation escalate further, prices above the previous highs of 2025 (>USD 80/barrel) would also be realistic. Rising energy prices would, in turn, generate inflationary pressure and influence monetary policy expectations. En-ergy-intensive industries and import-dependent economies would be particular-ly affected. Financial markets would then experience increased volatility, capital flows to safe havens, and greater currency fluctuations.

The crucial factor for further developments remains whether a rapid de-escalation occurs or whether the disruption of the Hormuz route becomes struc-tural in nature.

EMR February 2026

Dear Reader

INTEREST RATES & EQUITY INDEXES?

Hardly a day goes by without a commentary – or even a request of a responsible politicians to further cut interest rates, in order to guide the whereabouts of inflation and equity indexes. As of recently, a further determinant is due to the repetitive requests of politicians, and in recent times, specifically, by the current U.S. president.

As is well known, we are not entirely convinced by this approach. Clear indications can be gleaned from the following charts, showing the indexed yields of 10-year government bonds and of selected major stock indices in their respective currencies, for the period since January 3, 2022 as shown in the two following charts.

SURPRISING INFORMATIONS FROM THE CHARTS

• The developments showed in the charts differ strikingly from one another, don’t they? Who, among us, has ever predicted such a strong increase of the Japanese yields, as compared to the opposite trend in German and, to some extent, Swiss yields?
• We take note that the data in the charts clearly point to assumptions other than those most commonly reported in the media. They clearly show that government bond yields strongly vary from country to country, thus requiring specific treatment. The dynamic of US yields is quite surprising, when compared e.g. to the trend of UK interest rates. The Japanese yields show a shocking increase, while the US counterpart points exactly in the opposite direction.
• At this crossroads, we believe that there are divergent actions and reactions in the market beyond inflation fears. In other words, we assume that there must be other determinants to which interest rates are responding, but which are not being reported in the press. Is there any contextual indication as to why this is the case? We believe that the activities of consumers and investors play an important role as an argument for anti-inflationary policy.
• The data on stock indices, on the other hand, tend to develop in a rather similar way, at least in terms of trends. The scrutiny of the performances speak another language, don’t the they?
• There must be other factors than monetary policy, i.e. interest rate measures, determining the whereabouts of the equity markets. Recalling the rather complex landscape since the beginning of 2023 we began to take into account the rising authoritarianism, and consequent geopolitical instability.

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY

The overall assessment is not easy to define with a high degree of certainty, and this particularly due to the following reasons:

• Rather weak political leadership in the Western nations.
• Rather disturbing political whereabouts and respective economic growth repercussions, which in turn call for higher exposures towards the home market, taking account pf the specific currency outlook.
• As Swiss investors, we continue to be overexposed to our home currency and equity market, a rather contained exposure to the European currency and equity markets and a slightly under-exposure to US equity investments as well as the USD.
• One feature that does not receive sufficient attention concerns the fiscal policies of the US president. As is well known, he likes to announce fiscal policy measures that sometimes go beyond the rules of supply and demand. Unfortunately, at this juncture, we are not in able to assess how decisive these unilateral measures are, and will be, for consumer spending, not only in the United States but also for countries exporting to the United States. The crucial question is: when will Mr. Trump realize that his policy is wrong and react accordingly?

SHORT-TERM EXPECTATIONS

As the primary determinant of the short-to-medium-term outllook we view the Trumps tariffs, as they undoubtedly represent a tax increase primarily in the context of consumer spending. Let us recall that recently consumer spending has been the engine of economic activity, i.e. the major propellent of GDP growth – not solely for the United States!

The Trump`s tariff increases are viewed as having a similar impact as a tax increase promotor. Contextually, we ought to keep in mind that the trade policy of President Trump represents an important, i.e. deterministic reduction of the supply of goods and services, with an expected negative impact on inflation.

As implicitly shown in the above charts, we view the historic comparison as indeed astonishing. Coherently, we deduce that the Trump’s abstruse taxation policy might continue to be a most significant determinant for economic activity, and at the same time be highly deterministic for the whereabouts of inflation, not only for the USA. We expect significant repercussions on a worldwide scale.

Consequently, we expect, or worse, we fear a rather deterministic indication pointing towards a reduction of economic activity driven particularly by consumer and investment spending, on a worldwide scale.

SUMMA SUMMARUM

The next few quarters speak for lower economic activity, concerning primarily the United States, and in due time also the world markets. From an investment perspective these trend-expectations, will undoubtedly matter. They speak, if we understand the whereabouts correctly for a significant HOME BIAS concerning both equities as well as currencies.

The most promising approach remains DIVERSIFICATION, which to us, seems to be, at this juncture, the only “Free Lunch” promising motor, on a local, as well as on the international scale.

EMR January 2026

Dear reader

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Assessing the current context is a complex exercise, as there are differences between determining factors, such as:

• Will Russia’s war against Ukraine end soon?
• Will economic growth prospects be the driving force, or will politics continue to play a leading role?
• Will the focus be set primarily on the monetary actions and reactions by the Central Banks?
• Or will traditional economic thinking be the “new pioneer”?

Fact is that we are constantly being told that interest rate developments are crucial to curbing a feared rise in inflation. Based on available data, we wonder, which of the above-mentioned assumptions will really be the valid and deterministic argument.

OPERATIVE ASSUMPTIONS

In order to be set in the position to assess the respective impacts of the above asked questions, we kindly ask the reader to examine the data, as implicit contained in the following chart of 10-year Government Bond Yields for Switzerland, Germany, UK, Japan and the USA. To better understand what the recent developments have been, we have indexed the respective rates on November 3, 2022 to 1.

With regard to the impacts of monetary policy management as a promising investment guide, we believe that the current interpretation cannot be considered as a consistent and promising policy indicator in the forecasting exercise. Contextually, we ask ourselves, why does a large majority of forecasters continue to focus on interest rate management to solve the current impasse.

The chart shows significant and deterministic differences between the reported 10-year government bond yields. The real question is: what does the chart actually reveal? Does it represent something different from what is regularly reported in the media? We believe that the chart highlights the risk that could arise from interpreting the impact of interest rate changes, as is currently the case, based on changes in 10-year government bond yields as a guide for the near future. Nevertheless, we invite the reader to examine the divergent paths shown, in order to better assess their growth trajectories and coherent impacts. In doing so, we found the following:

• The development of Japanese 10-year yields is undoubtedly astonishing when compared to the opposite trend in German yields. We wonder what consequences this divergence might have for investments in Japan compared to Germany?
• Astonishingly stable, over the shown period, have been the performances of Swiss and US yields. Do the respective developments indicate a corresponding response to a different environment?

With regard to the effects of monetary policy management as a promising investment guide, we believe that the current interpretation cannot be considered as a consistent and promising policy indicator in the current forecasting exercise. Contextually, we ask ourselves, why does a large majority of forecaster continue to focus on interest rate management to solve the current impasse?

OUTLOOK

Given the political, economic and social environment pinpointed in the above shown chart, the outlook for 2026, looks like a “very complicated and rather difficult task,” does it not? After a thorough examination of the recent developments of 10-year government bond yields we ask ourselves the question: Will inflation really be the main enemy of policymakers and/or investors?

In the event that the monetary authorities remain focused on fighting inflation through interest rate management, the outlook for investment returns remains rather subdued.

Why, one may ask?

In times of war, the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and similarly disturbing developments in the Middle East, one might wonder how changes in interest rates might reduce the price of crude oil, especially in Europe? We should not forget that two of Europe’s largest economies (France and Germany) are going through a very tangled political situation, namely a serious lack of economic, social and political leadership. We think this context is quite problematic, if not dangerous.

However, if investors remain focused on sectors such as technology, as has been and should continue to be the case in the US, the outlook might significantly “brighten”. Certainly, at this crossroads we cannot predict what the new US administration will do, as the possibility of an America First policy is at the forefront.

SUMMING UP

Despite all the forecasting difficulties in timing, as Swiss franc investors, we continue to prefer our home market, primarily for efficiency reasons. We assume that the CHF will continue to be in high demand. As deducible from the above-mentioned General Conditions a highly deterministic factor is and will remain the war against Ukraine, particularly for security reasons, given its devastating, destructive importance of the availability of raw materials such as gas and crude oil.

Contextually, international diversification speaks, in line with the technological developments, once again for investment in the USA, despite the feared weakness of the USD vs. our own currency. As far as the EUR exposure is concerned, we are somewhat concerned about the political uncertainties in France and Germany.

While many analysts eagerly await monetary measures and reactions from central banks, we fear unprecedented actions and reactions from the US president, whose recent tax reform has had – and will likely continue to have – a rather negative impact on economic activity.

What we should keep in mind is the implicit lesson from recent interest rate trends – as shown in the chart above – which teaches us the importance of developments in exports and imports, including Mr. Trump’s jargoning. One of the lessons I learned a long-time ago, while attending Georgetown University in Washington D.C., is to thoroughly analyze economic facts, before taking a coherent decision.

I am sorry for not being able to portray a more promising outlook. Nevertheless, I wish us all the following:

May the coming year 2026 bring us all health, success and prosperity!

EMR December 2025

Dear Reader

REVIEW

By examining the graph of the monthly averages of the SPI, DJIA, and NDX indices over the last three years, we find important indications for the immediate future. One factor regards the yearly differential developments, rather congruent between the SPI and the DJIA, while the NDX index developments point to specific determinants, both concerning 2023 as well as for 2024. Let´s recall that the NDX, on its part, comprises the 100 Nasdaq-listed nonfinancial companies with the highest market capitalization.

The following illustrations show the de-facto developments of monthly averages of the three shown indexes for 2023, 2024 as well as 2025.

What do the charts show? Well, it is rather difficult to conclude that a significant correction is imminent, except for the NDX index. However, the performance of the SPI and the DJIA index over the last three years is very significant. The following can be deduced from our analysis:

• An initial conclusion indicates fairly consistent and stable growth for the SPI and DJIA. The NDX, on the other hand, shows fairly strong reactions. In this context, we could argue that the probability of an imminent correction can be assumed for the NDX index, but not for the other two indices. From a contextual point of view, we emphasize that the indication highlights continuous technological developments. On the other hand, the charts for the SPI and DJIA stock indices do not indicate significant differences, signaling a fairly stable environment. However, it should be noted that the differences in monthly averages are quite small compared to the unreported end-of-month data.
• Readers may argue that an analysis based on only three stock indices and only over three years is insufficient. For this reason, let us present the annual percentage change in the respective monthly averages of a number of stock indices, as shown in the following chart, stressing significant differences, as compared to the developments over the last three years.

The annual fluctuations between 2017 and 2022, compared to those of the last three years (see graphs above for SPI, DJIA, and NDX), are truly remarkable in terms of both their magnitude and from index to index, as can be seen from the graphs. A first specific argument, which is implicit but not apparent from the graph, concerns the fluctuations of the respective currencies (not shown in the graph). Another argument concerns the “technological” content of each index. It should be remembered that technology has played a decisive role in recent years – and will continue to do so – not only for the stock markets, but above all because of its manifold effects on the economic activity of various countries. At this point, it is worth comparing, at least by way of example, the fluctuations of the DJIA with those of the S&P 500 and/or the Nasdaq, as well as from country to country.

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Contextual analysis urges investors to take into account “additional and decisive factors,” such as Russia’s absurd war against Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, which we believe could continue to be highly deterministic. Expectations remain conditioned by geopolitical instability, while technological innovation and central bank measures aim to fuel certainty. As a result, we believe that the economic outlook is far from rosy. Crude oil producers continue to play a rather dangerous role. Their goal is to keep energy prices as high as possible, for as long as possible, essentially to finance absurd and devastating wars.

In addition to the fact that consumption is the engine of economic activity and has therefore been and continues to be the driver of prosperity, we also expect various stimuli from international trade in essential goods and services. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to contain price increases. Consequently, the actions and responses of monetary authorities should not focus excessively on fighting inflation, but rather on stimulating domestic economic activity, which requires a shift from foreign investment to domestic renewal. It should be noted that other components of GDP do not appear to have contributed significantly to economic activity, which is a striking sign of overall weakness.

To better explain the concept and for simplicity’s sake, we will limit our analysis to developments in the United States, assuming that the impact may be somewhat similar in other industrialized countries. US data since 1947 show that consumer spending remains the main contributor to GDP. However, the table below on US GDP and its main components reveals some rather surprising results. Over time, consumer spending has tended to be less pronounced, i.e., less of a driver. The gap has widened over time. The growth differential is clearly visible in the data (see table below), while all other components of GDP seem to make only a marginal contribution. Whether this assessment is “right” or “wrong” as a measure of their respective levels is the appropriate question at this stage. Isn’t that, right?

To analyze the data on US economic activity shown in the table below, let’s first define the items: GDP = Gross Domestic Product; C = Consumer spending; IFIX = Investment spending; X = Exports; M = Imports; and G = Government spending. The overall rates are summarized in the table below:

A careful examination of the data, shown in the table above, speaks volumes. Although the data indicate that consumer spending is the main driver, the growth rates of the other components of GDP suggest that imports are also a key factor, followed by exports and investment. Consumer spending ranks only fourth, while public spending precedes all other major components of GDP. The table confirms our conclusion that the causes of the current turmoil lie not so much in interest rate trends as in international social and moral turmoil (e.g. Russia’s war in Ukraine)!

EXPECTATIONS

The interpretation of the economic and political whereabouts remains controversial and difficult to define as a plausible and credible scenario. Volatility affects both the short and medium term. Monetary authorities and most analysts are primarily interested in restoring price stability, for example by means of higher interest rates. In this context, we continue to favor quality stocks, particularly in the technology sector. The level of long-term interest rates is favorable for quality bonds, at least in the medium term, which promise attractive yields and capital appreciation opportunities for the first time in a long time. Overall, we remain strongly focused on our domestic market for both equities and currencies.

Never before in human history has a pandemic forced governments around the world to shut down their economies so abruptly and almost simultaneously, only to revive them with massive stimulus packages. The outcome remains uncertain, pointing in some ways to a return of inflation, a contraction in the labor market, higher bond yield expectations, and persistently high public debt, all of which continue to fuel volatility.

At this time, we take the opportunity to wish you all a: MERRY CHRISTMAS & A HAPPY NEW YEAR 2026.

Comments are welcome.

EMR November 2025

Dear Reader

In this EMR, we would like to emphasize that the economic and investment environment has never been as complex and contradictory as it has been in recent years, and particularly in 2025. In our view, the current economic reality is unprecedented, while a new “ideological worldview” is shaping global politics and economics through self-appointed “dictators.” These developments are a cause for great concern, especially among quantitative economists. This is not primarily a question of economic reality, but rather a political issue.

In other words, we are currently facing a welfare dictatorship that has nothing to do with an interpretation based on the examination of concrete facts. The trend in stock market indices is truly revealing, as the following chart implicitly shows.

The stock index chart, in their respective currencies, shows two distinct growth paths, linked by a significant correction phase. The first growth path covers the period from early 2020 to early 2023, while the second covers the period from early 2023 onwards. Growth rates are similar, but deviations are significantly more pronounced in the second period. Are there reasons for this disparity? The outperformance of technology indices is indeed significant. It is surprising that the growth patterns of the indices shown are somewhat coordinated, de-spite significant differences between markets. At this crossroads, we ask our-selves: What could be the reasons for the differences highlighted in the chart above? At least in the case of US indices, this cannot be attributed to negative expectations about economic activity, but rather to the effects of potential technological growth.

In 2022, the main deterministic factors were fears of an impending economic slowdown, high and widespread inflation, and the unpredictable impact of the war in Ukraine, which disrupted trade and drove up energy and food prices.

The political and social actions and reactions of the US president are also sig-nificant and destabilizing factors for the stock and currency markets. It is wor-rying that the focus is mainly on trade that primarily benefits the US. The re-percussions on Europe and the rest of the world are given little consideration, both in terms of economic activity and the security of local infrastructure. President Trump’s intention is primarily to benefit the US economy, regardless of the impact on trading partners. From an investment perspective, this policy mainly affects foreign trade trends, while commentators remain focused on interest rate regulation to combat inflation.

CRITICAL FACTORS FOR THE OUTLOOK

From the complex political situation and Trump’s nationalistic intentions, as can be implicitly inferred from his mercantilist focus, we draw the following conclusions:

Sectoral growth prospects:

The prevailing opinion seems to support the hypothesis that the most sig-nificant deviations in forecasts are due to the effects of growth in foreign trade and private consumption. This assessment is mainly due to the tax increases introduced by the Trump administration. In our view, there is no doubt that the sometimes absurd tax increases will contribute to nega-tive growth forecasts and price increases, regardless of the measures taken by central banks and, in particular, the decline in consumption by the general public.

Inflation expectations and interest rate cuts:

Not a day goes by without negative comments about inflation or inflation expectations. The fact is that the White House has repeatedly urged the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, and will likely continue to do so, in order to stimulate economic growth and keep inflation under control. With all due respect, we disagree with these specific requests from the White House, as well as with the widespread and constantly reiterated “opinion of the majority of the public.”

We believe that the policy measures taken by the current US administra-tion cannot be determined solely by interest rate cuts. We are of the opinion that the tax burden cannot be resolved primarily through lower interest rates, given that the reduction in import prices at this time has little to do with the Fed’s measures. Foreign producers will seek to diver-sify their exports from the US to other countries, while at the same time seeking to reduce imports from the US.

Risk of Recession:

There is no doubt that the risk of recession is currently high and rising. The impact is not primarily on international trade, but on consumer spending. The political repercussions will be and remain the main source of great concern.

GROWTH PROSPECTS

According to our analysis, economic growth prospects have once again lost some of their recent momentum. We believe that this loss of momentum is mainly due to contradictory policies, which indicate a growing political trend toward an “increasingly closed market environment,” representing a dangerous shift toward isolationism. In such a political environment, it is unlikely that the policies implemented will produce the necessary and desired economic benefits, either for the United States or for its foreign counterparts. The question we are unable to answer at this time is when the US administration will initiate a reversal toward a more democratic environment. The current wave of “American nationalism” is not producing the expected economic benefits, either for the US fiscal authorities or for the foreign nations for which it was intended.

In our view, it seems rather obvious that, at this point in time, interest rate cuts may not be the optimal stimulus for economic growth, as the feared negative effects mainly concern consumer spending and international trade. A reduction in “valuable and necessary” imports of goods and services, achieved through tax increases by the importing country, does not necessarily encourage consumers to spend more, while price increases risk reducing the supply of essential foreign goods taxed by the importing country: the United States.

Furthermore, it seems rather obvious that, at this point in time, interest rate cuts will not stimulate economic growth in the country applying them, when the negative effects mainly affect consumer spending and international trade.

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

The real question is what impact the scenario described above could have on asset allocation. Below are our assumptions and conclusions:

• It can be assumed that economic and financial uncertainty will persist for some time to come.
• The repatriation of capital investments from abroad should reduce the uni-verse of international investments.
• At present, we believe that economic and financial uncertainty is likely to endure for some time, unless the US president changes his mercantilist stance.
• We still wonder why public opinion continues to focus on interest rate adjustments to curb inflation and promote economic growth.
• Considering the potential impact of President Trump’s fiscal policy, we conclude that it will force leading companies to evaluate and reconsider the consequences of transferring various products from abroad to their home countries, bearing in mind that this could lead to higher costs, which will further push companies to automate processes in order to reduce costs.
• Contrary to our recent expectations, we are currently focusing on our do-mestic market, Switzerland. Step by step, we will also make consistent ad-justments in favor of European markets and significantly underweight the US market.

OUTLOOK

At this point, we believe that the decisive factor for current forecasts is the inflationary impact of Trump’s fiscal mania. We therefore do not share the view of the vast majority of analysts that monetary policy measures are and should be the most promising path to economic growth. Given the dramatic inflationary impact of Trump’s fiscal policy, we do not see how monetary poli-cy measures by the Fed or any other central bank can or should be the main determining factors.

Our current assumptions are based on the following premises: contrary to our recent expectations, we are currently focusing on our domestic market: Swit-zerland. Step by step, we will also make consistent adjustments in favor of European markets and significantly underweight the US market.

• Our currency forecasts favor the CHF, EUR, and GBP, less so the JPY, and even less so the USD. We are concerned about the continued “devaluation” of the USD in line with Trump’s absurd fiscal policy and the US government’s “anti-Fed” stance. At this point, we wonder whether it is appropriate to hedge equity exposures against their respective USD currencies.

• We have no doubt that international investors could avoid the US market in response to the US president’s absurd fiscal policy and instead favor European markets and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese market. At this point, we won-der whether it is appropriate to hedge equity exposures against their respec-tive currencies in USD.

Dear reader, we would appreciate your informed opinions.

EMR October 2025

Dear Reader,

Historically mercantilism was a “state-controlled economic policy” from the 16th to the 18th century. Its aim was to strengthen the economic power of the state and accumulate national wealth, primarily through a positive trade balance as well as the accumulation of precious metals. The system was characterized by massive state intervention, such as the promotion of domestic manufacturing and the protection of domestic production through high import duties.

The effects, outlined above, clearly describe the current policy of the Trump administration, which consists of high import tariffs on a country-by-country basis. The current objectives can be described as an active trade balance with the primary goal of improving the trade balance and thus strengthening the national economy. In ióther words, with the recent actions of president Trump we assist to an absurd mercantilist revival, through the maximization of exports and/or the minimization of imports, by means of considerable taxation, varying from the various partner countries but primarily in favor of the United States.

Fact is that the trade balance, as we all know, is not a complicated concept, given that it is simply the difference between what a nation exports—both as goods and/or services—and what it imports. If the former amount is greater than the latter, we register a surplus—otherwise a loss.

Trumps concept and actions aim to reduce a further current accounts deficit or to reach a current accounts surplus. In addition it includes measures aimed at accumulating monetary reserves by means of a positive balance of trade, without taking into account the repercussios on the trading partners. The current attention to the mercantilist theory varies in sophistication from one writer to another and at the same time it evolves significantly.

Fact is that mercantilism promotes state regulation of a country’s economy in order to strengthen the power of the state at the expense of rival national powers. Disunity is the dangerous result of current policies. The current economic environment is generally defined or considered to be rather unique. Beeing interested in the relevance of developments, both current and long-term, we are aware of factors that are not adequately addressed in press reports and also in recent studies. We like to remember that price trends, as demonstrated by long-term data available in the United States, tell a story of constant change, sometimes minor, sometimes dramatic, and sometimes difficult to assess coherently. Therefore, we should bear in mind that inflation is a persistent problem, one that we may have to deal with, not only in the immediate future, but also longer term.

In other words, as stressed e.g. in the FRBSF Economic letter of September 2, 2025 “Recent surges in trade policy uncertainty highlight the fragility of global supply chains, prompting businesses to consider reshoring—moving production from abroad to domestic locations. Reshoring can be costly, creating incentives for businesses to automate. Evidence suggest that businesses facing heightened trade policy uncertainty in industries more exposed to international trade reshore more and automate more than those that are less exposed to trade. Automation appears to help mitigate the otherwise negative effects of trade policy uncertainty on production and labor productivity.”

What may be the implications for our asset allocation is the real question, isn’t it? Below we will present our expectations.

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

From the rather complicated situation described above, we draw the following conclusions:

1. Economic and financial uncertainty is expected to persist for a rather long period of time.
2. Currently, the two most important and decisive economic sectors are “foreign trade” and the “U.S. repatriation of capital investments from abroad”. Thus, we somehow are in contradiction with the current focus on interest rates as the primary determinant. In addition we assume that these developments might persist for a rather long period of time.
3. Consequently, we wonder why the overall public assessment remains focused on interest rate adjustments to curb inflation and promote economic growth. Meanwhile, investors are asking themselves how long Trump’s disastrous nationalist stance is likely to last and what the consequences might really be.
4. Asking ourselves what the implications of the Trumps taxation might be, we primarily retain that they will forse businesses to consider the impacts of reshoring of variouss products from abroad despite knowing that it might be a costly exercise, forcing businesses to automate in order to reduce costs.

We are somewhat concerned that this environment could fuel trade policy uncertainty (TPU), an index developed by Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino and Andrea Raffo at the Federal Reserve Board. In other words, this attitude is synonymous with deglobalization, which will eventually require an adjustment in production lines. Its impact on export and import growth, and therefore on real economic activity, is likely to be significantly greater than the demand for interest rate adjustments by monetary authorities.

REPOSITIONING AND AUTOMATION

The phase of dismantling trade barriers and the willingness to increase economic integration have reached a decisive crossroads. The tariff measures recently implemented by the Trump administration speak volumes. Isolationism is returning to the spotlight.

OUTLOOK

At this juncture, we believe that the determining factor in the current forecasting exercise concerns the inflationary repercussions of Trump’s fiscal mania. Therefore, we disagree with the vast majority of analysts who believe that monetary measures are the most promising course of action for economic growth. We do not see how monetary actions by the Fed, or any other central bank, can be the primary deterministic actions, given the dramatic inflationary impact of Trump’s fiscal stance.

We base our current assumptions on the following premises:

• Contrary to our recent expectations, we currently prefer to focus more on our domestic market: Switzerland. Step by step, we will also make consistent adjustments in favour of European markets and significantly underweight the US market.
• Our currency expectations favor the CHF and EUR, less so the JPY, and even less so the USD. We are concerned about the persistent “devaluation” of the USD in line with Trump’s absurd fiscal policy and the US administration’s “anti-Fed” stance.
• Somehow, we persist to disagree with the assumption that interest rate cuts in the United States should be considered the main driver of economic activity. It is a known fact that the focus of economic policy is centered on increasing import taxes, boosting fears of inflation.
• We have no doubt that international investors, in particular, could avoid the US market and favour European markets instead, and to a lesser extent the Japanese market, in response to the US president’s absurd fiscal policy.
• At this point in time, we wonder whether it would be appropriate to start hedging equity exposures against their respective currencies in USD.

Dear reader, we would really appreciate to know your coherent assessment?

EMR September 2025

Dear Reader,

The current economic environment is generally defined or considered to be rather unique, despite there being a long history of change. Being interested in the relevance of developments, both current and long-term, we are aware of factors that are not adequately addressed in press reports and recent studies. We like to remember that price trends, as demonstrated by long-term data available in the United States, tell a story of continuous change, sometimes minor, sometimes dramatic and difficult to assess. Therefore, we should bear in mind that inflation is a persistent problem, one that we may have to deal with not only in the immediate future.

What can be inferred from the US CPI inflation chart, considering that the average inflation rate for the period from 1872 to the present amounts to 2.37%, with a maximum of 17.84% and a minimum of -10.94%? Let us emphasize that the overall average trend—dotted line—has been slightly rising, while the recent trend (since 2000) indicates a significant slowdown.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the rate of change has been significantly higher in the period prior to 1870 than in the period thereafter. The graph also shows that the overall deviation for the period between 1980 and the early 1960s has been fairly modest.

The inflationary trend since the late 1970s has been surprisingly “moderate.” Without going into details about inflation trends, since the late 1970s we note a downward trend compared to the previous period. The reasons for this are not easily quantifiable, aren’t they?

Without examininsg the develomenats of inflation trends in other countries and currencies, to answer the above posed question, let us summarize key events that, so far, have had – and still might have – a decisive impact. Although the following list imight not be exhaustive, we believe it to be quite significant for the current forecasting outlook.

1. On January 20, 2025, Mr. Trump was inaugurated as president of the United States for a second non-consecutive term.
2. On April 9, 2025, he announced the suspension of customs duties for a period of 90 days, with the exception of China.
3. On April 17, 2025, he attacked Fed Chairman Powell with the statement, “When he leaves, it will be too late.”
4. On May 8, 2025, he signed a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.
5. On May 11, 2025, China and the United States signed a 90-day suspension
6. On May 16, 2025, Moody’s downgraded the United States’ rating from “AAA” to “Aa1.”
7. On May 23, 2025 Mr. Trump announced 50% duties to Europe.
8. On June 21, 2025 the U.S. bombs sites of Iran for uranium enrichment.
9. On July 8, 2025 Mr. Trump extended the deadline for new agreements to August 1, 2025 (e.g. tariffs on copper of 50% and also 200% tariffs on pharmaceuticals).
10. On August 7, 2025, he did not “chair” the meeting with the high-level Swiss delegation at the White House.
11. Meeting in Alaska, August 15, 2025, between US and Russian presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, was billed as a promising step towards peace in Ukraine. According to press information no ceasefire and an invitation to Moscow, were announced! The meeting yielded more questions than answers.

Now let us ask ourselves what can we deduce from the long-term U.S. inflation chart, taking into account the above listed developments regarding the economic outlook and financial market trends?

BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE

The current political and economic environment is quite complex, making it difficult to assess with a high degree of certainty and precision. Even a fairly simple analysis of price changes reveals that, on many occasions, we have faced economic and social contexts that were difficult to predict. Price inflation, as we all know, has been a persistent and challenging problem, one that we may continue to face. not only in the near future, but also in the longer term. In the economic literature, we have found specific phases, that began in a very similar way to what is happening now. The phases that come to mind indicate similar starting points and, at times, divergent paths, known as stages. A “simple” review of price changes shows, as implicitly illustrated in the chart above, that we have almost always faced considerable difficulties in forecasting. We therefore assume that price inflation could persist and, with the active support of President Trump, could be a serious forecasting obstacle not only over the short term but also in the longer term. In the economic literature, we find certain phases that begin very similarly while leading to different outcomes. At this point, we would like to point to four main phases, illustrating current forecasting difficulties:

• A first phase might be defined as a phase of “quiet beginnings, and also of slow progress”.
• A second, slightly different phase, is characterized by the “overcoming” of previous price limits. The contextual and deterministic factors were wars and/or changes in the system of government, as well as drastic increases in the prices of raw materials such as crude oil.
• A third phase concerns the hypothesis that “price changes are due to inflation expectations,” i.e., changes in long-term trends. A particular limitation concerns the assumption that investors believe that the trend may require an expansion or contraction of the money supply. At this stage, the rate of change in the money supply is considered the relevant indicator which, in due course, would confirm to some extent the assumptions of an increase/decrease in inflation. In this context, economists refer to financial market instability.
• Finally, the fourth wave “peaks and breaks down with shattering force”, with dramatic consequences, including recessions and political change

It should be borne in mind that each phase had significant social consequences and that each price trend exhibited common wave structures of varying duration and scope.

Implicitly “visible” in the above shown chart are also the respective effects on the medium-term inflation outlook.

Currently, as in the past, there will be social and economic disparities also on a country-by-country basis. Even today forecasters should seriously consider the implicit impacts on the asset allocation exercise.

 

The recent meeting between US and Russian presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, in Alaska was billed as a vital step towards peace in Ukraine. As we see it, without a ceasefire and an invitation to Moscow, the meeting has yielded more questions than answers.

OUTLOOK DETERMINANTS

At this crossroads, we believe that the determining factor in the current forecasting exercise concerns the inflationary repercussions of Trump’s fiscal mania. Therefore, we disagree with the vast majority of analysts who believe that monetary measures are the most promising course of action for economic growth. We do not see how the monetary actions of the Fed, or any other central bank, should be the primary deterministic actions, given the dramatic inflationary impact of Trump’s fiscal stance. The meeting between the US and the Russian presidents, D. Trump and V. Putin, in Alaska, can be billed as a vital step towards peace in Ukraine. With no ceasefire and an invitation to Moscow, the meeting has yielded more questions than answers.

EXPECTATIONS

Our specific assumptions are based on the following setting:

1. As in previous EMRs, we persevere in favoring primarily investments in our home market: Switzerland followed with coherent judgement by investments in Europe and a significant underexposure to the USA.
2. Our currency expectations continue to favor the CHF and EUR, less so the JPY, and even less so the USD. We are concerned about the persistent devaluation of the USD in line with Trump’s absurd fiscal policy and the US administration’s “anti-FED” stance.
3. Somehow, we disagree with the assumption that interest rate cuts in the USA ought to be viewed as the primary motor of economic activity. The center of economic policy is set on “increases in import-taxation” boosting fears of inflation.
4. In our opinion, investors will avoid the US market, favoring the European markets and, to a lesser extent, the Japanese market, as an appropriate response to the absurd policy of the US president.
5. At this point, we wonder whether it would be appropriate to start hedging equity exposures against their respective currencies in USD.

Dear reader, we would really appreciate to know your coherent assessment?

* Mark Twain

EMR August 2025

Dear Reader

What can be deduced from the performance of selected share indices for the recent past and the foreseeable future is, at this crossing, the real question, isn’t it?

In order to answer the above quoted question, let us first summarize which key events we define as having been deterministic. The list may not be ex-haustive, nevertheless we still consider it meaningful.

1. For the first time, on January 20, 2025, Mr. Trump was installed in the White House.
2. On April 2, 2025, Mr. Trump announces duties to the world
3. On April 9, 2025, he announces the suspension for the duration of 90 days of duties, excluding China.
4. On April 17, 2025, he attacks the chairman of the FED, Mr. Powell, with the statement “When he leaves it will be too late”.
5. On May 8, 2025, he signed a trade accord between the USA and the UK.
6. On May 11, 2025, China and the USA signed a 90-day suspension.
7. On May 16, 2025, Moody’s downgraded the rating of the U.S. from “AAA” to “Aa1”.
8. On May 23, 2025, Trump announced 50% duties to Europe.
9. On June 21, 2025, the U.S. bombed sites of Iran for uranium enrichment.
10. On July 8, 2025, Trump extended the deadline for new agreements to Au-gust 1, 2025, (e.g. tariffs on copper of 50%, and also 200% tariffs on pharmaceuticals).

In addition, let us ask ourselves: What can be deduced from the chart of Eq-uity Indexes, expressed in local currencies? Is it primarily the unexpected “superb performance” of the German DAX index, while keeping in mind its currency developments? So far, the weakest indexes have been the NIKKEI, followed rather closely by the DJIA, and the NASDAQ, as well as the SPI. While most commentators are focused on the astonishing – to say the least – policy of the US president, one might face a dilemma analyzing the economic environment.

A further surprising result is shown by the poor performance of the so-called economic fundamentals, which, to us, appear to be misplaced by the so-called instantaneous arbitrage. If share indices represent the “new” funda-mentals, then one could conclude that real economic facts, such as economic activity, are currently being “played off” by the short-term or instantaneous return of capital.

Another contextual puzzle, as implicitly shown in the above shown chart of the USD/CHF developments, refers to the deterministic repercussions of currencies. While the chart on equity indexes describes the growth trend of each index, the currency chart speaks of sizeable volatility on a month’s end basis. The real question at this crossing is: Why is there such a disparity in the specific trends of equities and currencies?

Contextually, we argue that the fundamentals, at least for the short-term outlook, matter less and less. In other words, they represent specific difficulties in defining a rewarding investment outlook.

OUTLOOK DETERMINANTS

Should our assessment assume that the fundamentals (Consumption, Business Fixed investments, Government outlays and international trade) are no longer in the driver’s seat of the developments of coming months and quarters, then we must reckon with increasing difficulties for Central Banks.

The main difficulty to be assessed relates to the outcome of the Trump administration’s ambiguous policy of erratic and at times absurd taxation versus the needs and requirements of the Federal Reserve in managing interest rates. The relevant question relates to the likelihood of a recession not only in the US.

Contextually, we can also ask ourselves the following: What is the risk for investors, given that the stock market, at least in the short – to medium term, may become more of a race against the “signal” than a reflection of the real value of a specific stock and/or index. In this context, the price of a stock looks more like an algorithm than of a human valuation. Therefore, investors need to understand whether it is more important to them how much they gain, or lose, than the ultrafast robots. In this context, we face a difficult question: “Do we understand what it means to play in a field where it is not the invisible hand of the economy that controls the situation, but the ultra-fast hand of a software program?”

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

As long as Mr. Trump is “free to act and react to his own opinion and stance” the outlook remains hardly quantifiable. Coherently, we persist in setting the investment focus on our domestic equity market, Switzerland, particularly taking into account the traditional revaluation of the home-currency and the dramatic, expected further devaluation of the USD.

INVESTMENT CONCLUSIONS

International diversification will need to be discussed and implemented in accordance with each client’s expectations, tailored to their risk aversion.

Suggestions are welcome.

EMR July 2025

Dear Reader,

DEBT AND INVESTORS

Factors worrying investors do not seem to concern the ups and downs of stock indices, the price of gold or even the price of oil, but rather the yields on interest rates (e.g. the yield on 10-year government bonds), which are mainly due to the policies of the Trump administration. This is where the de-terministic lines cross in terms of confidence, liquidity and, above all, the sus-tainability of the economic system and the financial system in particular.

At this point let us recall when the Trump presidencies took place. Donald Trump was first inaugurated on January 20, 2017, as the nation’s 45th presi-dent and his presidency ended on January 20, 2021. Joe Biden served as his successor. Trump was then elected for a second, nonconsecutive term in 2024 and assumed the presidency again on January 20, 2025, as the nation’s 47th and current president.

Examining the graph of 10-year government bond yields for the period since March 2005, we see that the downward trend bottomed out with the election of successor, Joe Biden. Since Biden took office, 10-year government bonds yields have risen rather differentially. U.S. and British rates have outpaced German, Swiss, and Japanese rates, implying a differential impact on a na-tional basis. Readers might recall that trend differentials are indicating an un-stable outspeaking of a high level of forecasting uncertainty.

We should bear in mind that the economic situation in the years 2006 to 2008 has been strongly determined by the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the corresponding impact on the global economy. The crisis, which began in the United States with the bursting of the real estate bubble, had far-reaching consequences for the financial markets and the real economy throughout the world.

Examining the chart of 10-Y Govt. bond yields and taking into account that the recent spread is primarily due to the risky U.S. policy, focused on taxing U.S. imports, thus disrupting fiscal policy, not only at the U.S. level, but also on a global scale. The U.S. financial deficit must be financed, which in the long run leads to the potential for sharply rising interest rates. Markets evidently fear the servicing of this debt, interpreting it as a systemic macroeconomic problem that the current U.S. administration cannot or will not handle. At this crossing we are somehow worried by the politically induced calls of analysts and politicians to request additional interest rate increases. We should not forget to examine the developments of the equity indexes for the period since e.g. 2008. Actually, this is what we are interested in, in the following chapter.

SUGGESTIONS FROM US & SWISS REAL GDP & COMPONENTS

The graphical representation of the quarterly whereabouts of real GDP and main components, in Switzerland and the USA, shown in the following charts is indeed telling. The discrepancies must be taken seriously, with regard to the short- and medium-term outlook. Turning our attention to recent quarters, mainly as a result of the Trump administration’s taxation policies, we find that most forecasters are concerned with the recent developments. The shown real GDP data speak volumes, particularly in terms of the misrepresentation of the policies pursued by the US administration.

The data portrayed in the chart of US GDP and components, undoubtedly point to the primarily impacts of exports and imports and partially also on fixed investments, specifically in Q1 2025. Let us ask the reader to examine the growth rates of GDP, Consumption (C) and Government spending (G) for the US as compared to Swiss developments.

While the focus in the media is set on interest rates expectations and corresponding reactions on the currency front, in both charts, we see the impact of international trade, which is mainly due to Trump’s erratic tax imposition, as the primary determinant of the current economic whereabouts.

Surprising is the increase (!) in imports (M) in the first quarter of 2025 for both Switzerland and the United States, especially when compared to the limited increases in 10-year government bond yields. Looking at the graphs of Swiss and U.S. economic activity, we see an extraordinary dependence on international trade, that is, exports and especially imports, conditioned by the U.S. administration, predominantly visible in the first quarter of 2025. We wonder why on earth, we feel so alone in assessing the economic environment on the basis of international trade, instead of following the herd, which focuses its rationale mainly on interest rates to counter inflation as the main determinant of economic expectations and thus economic activity in the coming quarters. Of course, we will certainly see some developments in fixed investment and U.S. interest rates in the coming quarters, but not as the most crucial determinants.

OUTLOOK DETERMINANTS

Forecasting is a challenging exercise, determined primarily by specific assessments of the political, economic and social environment, based mainly on hard data. Currently a further difficulty concerns the whereabouts in the Middle East. The setting is currently really difficult to quantify.

While most analysts set theirs focus on inflation vs. interest rate changes as well as currencies ups and downs, we set our focus in the components of real GDP and particularly on exports and imports of goods and services.

PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW

The next months and quarters remain hardly quantifiable. Coherently, we persist in setting the investment focus on our domestic equity market, particularly taking into account the traditional revaluation of the home-currency and the dramatic, expected further devaluation of the USD.

INVESTMENT CONCLUSIONS

International diversification will need to be discussed and implemented in accordance with each client’s expectations, tailored to their risk aversion.

Suggestions are welcome.